We have introduced some of the science and society issues in the first eight modules, and you have, by now, soaked up what you need to know to begin to formulate your own strong impressions of the major local and global issues and to come to some conclusions regarding possible solutions to them. In modules 9 and 10, we will expect more of you in the way of synthesis and solution.
The Pacific Institute has compiled a very cool, comprehensive list of water conflicts (Pacific Institute: The World's Water [1]) spanning recorded human history. Each event is accompanied by a brief account of the issue. Many of the earlier events chronicle the attempts to use water as an instrument of warfare—as a barrier to invasion, poisoning of water wells to deprive enemies of water, or destruction of water impoundments and irrigation systems, for example. World politics and creation of new nation-states in the twentieth century, however, created a different sort of conflict based on the need to divide crucial water resources between developing countries with burgeoning populations.
In this module, we will entertain several examples of international "water wars," referring to conflicts that occur within or between countries as the result of failed treaties and agreements, water supply interruptions, climate- or population growth-induced water shortages, and related issues. You are already familiar with an early and ongoing water conflict that involved the California-based antagonism between the City of Los Angeles and the Owens Valley beginning in the early 1900s (a conflict briefly entertained in Module 8.1 and related activities). Such episodes have a familiar cause—population growth, growing water shortage, acquisition of water, conflict, growth stimulated or supported by new water resources—creating a vicious cycle, as in the Los Angeles case.
Chapter 7 in "The Big Thirst" deals with the effects of climate change on rainfall in areas of already limited rain in Australia and suggests that this may be a problem for the long term. So-called "cli-fi," films, with apocalyptic climate-change scenarios at the heart of their plots, have become popular. No less than the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees all American intelligence agencies has released a report that suggests that climate change, and its influence on water availability, is a major near-future security issue. The United Nations World Food Program has estimated that 650 million people are living in areas where flood and drought can lead to food shortages and price spikes. For example, in East Africa, drought has led to warring among Somali clans for access to potable water. You should keep in mind the lessons of Module 8 Part 2 as we examine water "sharing" in this module—climate change enters into consideration of all of the examples herein, but is only explicitly mentioned in section called "The United States and Mexico—Sharing the Flow?" for the Colorado and Rio Grande River systems. A good example of internal issues related to recent climate change (prolonged drought) and poor government policy can be found here for Iran Washington Institute [2].
In completing this lesson, you will:
There are many examples of water disputes involving cross-boundary uses of shared resources. Three of these examples will be discussed in this section: The Nile River Conflict, The India-Bangladesh Ganges River Split, and The United States and Mexico— Sharing the Flow.
There are many examples of water disputes involving cross-boundary uses of shared resources. For example, in Module 5, we discussed the damming of the Nile River in Egypt and the Nile River's importance to development and water supply in Egypt. The construction of the Aswan Dam, which was authorized by a Nile Waters Agreement of 1959, was of little immediate concern to countries in the source regions of the Nile (Figs. 1 and 2), but guaranteed water rights allocated by earlier agreements were. Egypt initially negotiated the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 with, what was then, a number of East African colonies of Britain (British as signatories). Through this agreement, Egypt was assigned rights to 48 billion cubic meters/year (bcm/y), including all dry-season flow (mainly from the White Nile), and Sudan, just to Egypt's south, was initially apportioned 4 bcm/y. In addition, Egypt had the right to veto upriver water projects. A later treaty, the so-called 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, allocated 55.5 bcm/y to Egypt and 18.5 bcm/y to Sudan—the total allocation was nearly 90% of the estimated average annual Nile River flow (84 bcm/y, mostly from the Blue Nile)! This was accomplished prior to independence for the other countries within the watershed and failed to include the monarchy of Ethiopia in negotiations. Interestingly, at the time of the agreement, the White Nile was considered, in error, the source of most of Nile water. Seasonal summer monsoonal rains in the Ethiopian Highlands are the source of much of the Nile waters, through the Blue Nile.
Conflicts have arisen, particularly since Ethiopia embarked on dam building. In 2010, six of the nine upstream countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania) signed a Cooperative Framework Agreement seeking more water shares from the Nile. Egypt and Sudan rejected the agreement because it challenged their historic water allocations but to no avail. A major dam on the Blue Nile, the Grand Renaissance Dam, is under construction near the Ethiopia-Sudan border. As of May 2016, the dam was about 70% complete, with a target date of 2017 to begin producing power (it is worth noting, however, that the original target date was 2015 - political conflict and construction issues have slowed progress on the dam). Sudan and Egypt are, understandably, concerned about what will occur to Nile flows as the reservoir behind this huge dam fills, but Ethiopia is hoping that the water and power supplied by this structure will boost their economy and help other surrounding nations as well. Ethiopia's population in 1950 was about 18.1 million, but by 2023 it had grown to 126.5 million (114 people/km2). In 1950, Egypt had a population of 21.5 million, and in 2023 there are 112.7 million (112 people/km2).One can see that demand for water must be increasing (source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [3]), and that Ethiopia's growth has outstripped that of Egypt. However, Ethiopia has some other sources of water (estimated total river runoff at 122 bcm/y and additional large groundwater resources estimated at 6 bcm), whereas Egypt and Sudan must depend primarily on Nile water. However, Ethiopia has no storage capacity, hence the move to build a number of large dams. Will Egypt and Ethiopia go to war over Nile water? (see Analysis: Why Ethiopia and Egypt aren’t fighting a water war [4] for a perspective ).
Bangladesh achieved independence from Pakistan in 1971, following a short uprising. Bangladesh occupies the region of the original state of Bengal in India, which first became East Pakistan in 1947. India supported Bangladesh in the conflict with Pakistan.
The Ganges River (Fig. 3) was supposed to be shared in some way between India and Pakistan. It is fed by many tributaries (54) the largest of which is the Brahmaputra River that flows through Bangladesh, but most of the Ganges River Basin is in northeastern India. Summer monsoons deliver nearly 80 percent of annual rainfall for this region resulting in peak river flows from June-September. In an average year, it is estimated that 1200 billion m3 of precipitation falls in the Ganges catchment. Of this, nearly 500 billion m3 moves downriver. Dry season flows are much reduced.
India's proposal to construct the Farraka Barrage (a large dam) in West Bengal on the Ganges River right near the border led the two countries to meet over disputed water claims that originated in the 1950s following Bangladesh statehood. There was no resolution to the conflict and the dam was put into place by India without an agreement, with completion in 1975. The dam was constructed to divert some proportion of the Ganges flow into the Hooghly River (during the dry season in order to remove silt that was negatively affecting the port of Calcutta or Kolkata, Fig. 3). Although Bangladesh complained to the United Nations following severe water shortages in 1976, there was no significant resolution until 1996, when India and Bangladesh signed a 30-year treaty that provided for the partitioning of the flow of the Ganges River. The Ganges forms a border between the two countries for part of its course and continues to flow through Bangladesh to the Bay of Bengal. The 1996 treaty guaranteed India a flow of nearly 1000 m3/sec between January 1 and May 31. Much of the time Bangladesh receives less water than allocated by the treaty. India's population in 1950 was 376.3 million while the population of Bangladesh was only 37.9 million. Now India's population is 1.4 billion, (425 people/km2) and the Bangladesh population is 168.7 million (1136 people/km2). Bangladesh has a much greater population density but both countries have a great need for clean water and dependable water supply.
Most people in the U.S. probably don't think much about what water Mexico takes from the Colorado or the Rio Grande Rivers, which originate in the U.S. and flow along the U.S.-Mexico Border for some distance, and, in the case of the Colorado River, flow through Mexico to the sea (Fig. 4). Like the examples above (the Nile and Ganges Rivers), there are treaties that provide for sharing of the flow of these two North American rivers between the U.S. and Mexico. You have already read about the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Module 8.1). In effect, the flow of the Colorado River is, on average, significantly less than the total amount apportioned to individual states in the watershed. The 1922 Colorado River Compact was vague about the amount of water that was to be supplied to Mexico. This was rectified in a 1944 Treaty that provided for 1.5 million acre-feet of water per year to flow to Mexico (about 10% of the average Colorado River flow).
Until the present, the U.S. has bypassed the requisite amount of water from the Colorado to Mexico every year, regardless of the total flow of the Colorado. Because of recent severe droughts in the southwestern U.S., however, a 5-year Agreement (Minute 319), signed in 2012, was brokered that allows the U.S. to reduce the amount of water shared with Mexico when Colorado River flow was much lower than normal. In that agreement, Mexico, which has little Colorado River storage capacity (only Morelos Dam and reservoir), will be allowed to store some of its surplus water in Lake Mead, behind Hoover Dam. In addition, the U.S. will help finance improvements to Mexico's water infrastructure ($21 million), which was badly damaged by an earthquake in 2010, and pledged to "reconnect" the Colorado River with the Gulf of California. The U.S. and Mexico committed to each supply 5,000 acre-feet of water a year to the delta. Accoring to the LA Times [5] in 2014, because of the Agreement, a "pulse flow" event occurred whereby, in March, nearly 105,000 acre-ft of water was released from Morelos Dam (Mexico) to restore (at least briefly) flow to the Colorado River Delta in the Gulf of California (Fig. 5). The intent was to begin to restore riparian ecosystems along the Colorado River in Mexico. However, in 2022, Mexico’s share of water was cut by 5% and nearly 7% in 2023. These pulse flows continue every spring and vegetation is beginning to thrive.
Of interest is the fact that there was more to the water allocation Treaty of 1944. In that Treaty, both the amount and quality of water allocated to Mexico were stipulated. The TDS of waters released to Mexico had to be below 1000 ppm. Alas, the salinity of Colorado River water behind Morelos Dam was typically greater than that because of evaporation and irrigation return flow (leached salt from arid-region agricultural soils in southern Arizona) So, the U.S. built desalinization plant in 1975 near Yuma to treat water to reduce TDS to maintain the agreed-upon values behind Morelos Dam in Mexico (actually partly in Arizona) according to stipulations made by the International Boundary and Waters Commission (IBWC) in 1973. However, the plant was never put into operation because of a period of high flow and lower salinity on the Colorado River. During the period 1973 to 2006, all the return flow from agricultural operations in the Yuma region (TDS=2500ppm; avg. nearly 125,000 acre-ft) was released to Mexico and flowed to the Ciénega de Santa Clara wetlands in Mexico (Fig. 6). This flow substantially contributed to the significant ecological development of the Ciénega as a wetland. In 2011, however, the desalination plant was tested for a year, and the flow of water to the Ciénega de Santa Clara was substantially reduced, with an associated increase in total dissolved solids (TDS>3200ppm). It remains to be seen whether the relatively low treatment volumes (30,000 acre-ft/y) of the desalination plant as configured are a benefit in light of concerns over the fate of the renewed Ciénega de Santa Clara ecosystem (over 30 yrs of runoff) and its endangered species (Yuma Clapper Rail and desert pupfish).
The Rio Grande River flows along the U.S. (Texas)-Mexico border for nearly 1,248 miles (2,008 km) including meanders. Although snowmelt from the San Juan Mountains of Colorado (Fig. 7) is a major source of water for the Rio Grande, runoff from northern Mexico also contributes to its flow. As in all arid to semiarid regions, the waters of the Rio Grande River are highly sought after and overallocated. And, as in the case of the Colorado River, the water division between the U.S. and Mexico is regulated by Treaty (see below).
Rio Grande River water is in demand because of the intense agriculture in New Mexico-Texas (Fig. 8) as well as in northern Mexico. This water supply deficit has been exacerbated by prolonged drought in the southwest. Figure 9 is a long-term record of flow of the Rio Grande River (at Otowi Bridge) reconstructed by tree ring records calibrated to more modern flows (see TreeFlow [6]). Note the frequent cycles of surfeit and drought, and the most recent steadily decreasing flow trend beginning about 1990.
In all, there are 15 dams on the Rio Grande River, many of them in New Mexico. Flows are significant until Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico. El Paso, TX is 125 river miles downstream of Elephant Butte Reservoir and just upstream of the American Dam. Releases from Elephant Butte Reservoir control streamflow to El Paso. At American Dam, much of the flow in the Rio Grande is diverted for irrigation and municipal uses in Texas and Mexico. From the American Dam, the Rio Grande has little or no flow until joined by the Río Conchos about 300 miles downriver, which originates in the Sierra Madre Occidental in Mexico (see below). The Pecos River, a major U.S. tributary, joins the Rio Grande another 300 miles or so downriver near Langtry, TX (Fig. 7); the Pecos flow is also controlled by a dam upstream from its confluence with the Rio Grande. Further downriver, the flows in the Rio Grande River decrease significantly as the result of withdrawal for agricultural and municipal use in southwest Texas as well as the relatively low influx of water from tributaries. In Some years, the Rio Grande flow does not even make it to the sea near Brownsville, TX.
About 75% of water withdrawals from the Rio Grande River are in support of agriculture. Population growth has also been a factor, particularly in Mexico, where the population has nearly doubled since 2005, and nearly 6 million people depend on the Rio Grande River and related groundwater basins for drinking water. The U.S.-Mexico Treaty of 1848 established the international boundary, modified slightly by later "Conventions." The Treaty of 1944 between the two countries partitioned water from the Rio Grande River along the Texas-Mexico Border (as well as stipulating Colorado River flows to Mexico, see above), modified slightly by a 1970 Treaty, and authorized both countries to construct, operate, and maintain dams on the main channel of the Rio Grande. The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) was assigned the task of dealing with water quality issues along the international border.
According to the Treaty of 1944, the U.S. is entitled to about one-third of the flow of the Rio Conchos from Mexico, which amounts to about 350,000 acre-ft/y on average. By the Treaty, Mexico is obligated to release 1.5 million acre-ft over a five-year period. During times of drought, it is difficult to meet the annual expectation, and, typically, Mexico releases more water in good rainfall-runoff years and conserves during drought periods, although at one point Mexico did not meet their obligation for nearly ten years. This pattern makes it difficult for agriculture in southwest Texas because water resources cannot be adequately predicted, and, in 2013, a controversy erupted between Texas and Mexico because of long-term drought that peaked in 2011 (Texas Observer: On the Border, a Struggle over Water [9]) --another example of the difficulties of sharing even major rivers.
Consider the water supplied by the Rio Grande River. In many years there is a trickle of water, or less, that reaches the sea. Why? Obviously, the water inputs are less than or equal to the outputs.
The Rio GrandConstruct a simple system diagram that represents the interplay between the "forces" that influence the flow of the Rio Grande River. Think about aspects of climate, population growth, and water demand as they influence Rio Grande River flow to the sea. Treat the Rio Grande flow/storage as a "reservoir" (total annual water availability in that system) and consider the most important inputs and outputs and the factors that drive them (refer to Module 1 for a background on systems thinking and systems diagrams). When you complete your system diagram on paper, click on the link to see what we expected you to include.
Click for answer.
Once you have studied the diagram, construct the "equations" for Annual Runoff and Annual Water Demand. Do the units match? How do you think this system would behave if the changes in inputs and outputs were large on a yearly basis?
Click for answer.
ANSWER:
Annual Runoff= Climate Variation x Annual Precipitation x Drainage Area
Annual Water Demand= Evaporation + (Water Use/Person x Percent Growth/y x Population)
If decreases in Runoff and increases in Water Demand were large (e.g. >1%/year) the Rio Grande would likely not flow to the sea. You could test this by putting realistic numbers into a model using these system relationships and running for several years.
Links
[1] http://worldwater.org/water-conflict/
[2] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/water-insecurity-irans-formidable-threat
[3] http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm
[4] http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-11-05-analysis-why-ethiopia-and-egypt-arent-fighting-a-water-war/#.VFwaeefO5iI
[5] https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2023-01-31/colorado-river-in-crisis-the-rivers-end
[6] http://www.treeflow.info/rio-grande-basin
[7] https://nrtwq.usgs.gov/nwqn/#/
[8] https://www.climate.gov/
[9] https://www.texasobserver.org/on-the-border-a-struggle-over-water/