The links below provide an outline of the material for this lesson. Be sure to carefully read through the entire lesson before returning to Canvas to submit your assignments.
Note: You can print the entire lesson by clicking on the "Print" link above.
Cultural geography has been applied in a number of different disciplines, and none without so much controversy as within intelligence and military contexts. This lesson is designed to introduce you to the evolution of the use of cultural geography in military and intelligence disciplines, as well as to the value it brings to those disciplines. It will also introduce you to the controversies that have surrounded the inclusion of cultural geographic concepts at a variety of different scales. Finally, this lesson challenges you to consider the ethical dilemmas that surround this academic discipline’s inclusion in military and intelligence operations, and how to potentially ameliorate those dilemmas so these disciplines can complement each other in relative harmony.
Upon completion of this lesson you should be able to:
If you have any questions now or at any point during this week, please feel free to post them to the GEOG 571 - General Discussion Forum. (That forum can be accessed at any time in Canvas by opening the Lesson 0: Welcome to GEOG 571 module in Canvas.)
This lesson is one week in length. Please refer to the Calendar in Canvas for specific time frames and due dates. To finish this lesson, you must complete the activities listed below. You may find it useful to print this page out first so that you can follow along with the directions.
Step | Activity | Access/Directions |
---|---|---|
1 | Read the Lesson 2 online lecture notes. | The lecture notes can be accessed by clicking on the Lesson 2: Cultural Geography, Intelligence, and Security link in the Lessons menu on this page. |
2 |
Required Reading |
Medina, R. M. (2016). From anthropology to human geography: Human terrain and the evolution of operational sociocultural understanding. Intelligence and National Security, 31(2), 137-153. Pawinski, M. (2018). Going beyond Human Terrain System: Exploring ethical dilemmas. Journal of Military Ethics, 17(2-3), 122-139. Price, B. R. (2017). Human terrain at the crossroads. Joint Force Quarterly, 87(4), 69-75. Wainwright, J. D. (2016). The U.S. military and human geography: Reflections on our conjuncture. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 106(2), 513-520. Meyerle, J., Katt, M., and Gavrilis, J. (2012). Vignette 2: U.S. Marine Battalion, Nawa, Helmand 2009. In J. Meyerle, M. Katt, and J. Gavrilis (Eds.), On the ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in practice (pp. 37-51). Marine Corps University Press. Note: Registered students can access the readings in Canvas by clicking on the Library Resources link. |
3 | Complete the Lesson 2 Team Debate. | Instructions for the team debate can be found on the 2.8 Team Debate Exercise [1] page of this lesson. You can find the prompt for the Lesson 2 Team Debate in the Lesson 2: Cultural Geography, Intelligence, and Security module in Canvas. |
4 | Complete your Research Project Topic. | Submit your research project proposal and associated information to the Lesson 2 Research Project Topic dropbox in the Lesson 2: Cultural Geography, Intelligence, and Security module in Canvas. The dropbox contains the information you will need to complete the assignment. |
Note: Please refer to the Calendar in Canvas for specific time frames and due dates.
While this course is academic in nature, it will use the intelligence process and its components as a framework to help introduce the importance of cultural geographical concepts to human security and intelligence analysis. Throughout the course, we will refer back to some of these components to help aid in your understanding of where cultural geography may be most helpful and applicable within the Intelligence Process Framework.
There are five major components to the intelligence analysis process. While a variety of different terms are used to describe each component, generally they are: planning, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.
The planning component of the process often begins with some request for information or a need. Once that need has been expressed, a plan to complete the request is devised. This plan may include analytic techniques required and collection strategies to collect the information needed to conduct the analysis.
The collection component deals with the gathering of information. This information can often be gathered from a number of different intelligence sources. In this course, we’ll mostly be focusing on GEOINT (geospatial intelligence), but there are a variety of different intelligence disciplines for places from which information can be derived, including OSINT (open source intelligence) and HUMINT (human intelligence) (Clark, 2011).
The processing component is where analysts take the results from your collections strategies, which is often raw information, and create usable information. An example of this is exploiting imagery, translating an article, or evaluating information for its reliability (Intelligence Careers, n.d.).
The analysis component takes the information that results from the processing component and synthesizes this information to formulate assessments and judgements.
Finally, the dissemination component is where the results of the analysis are put into a form that is conveyed to customers. While this can take a variety of forms, we’ll introduce you to one form of dissemination: the written brief.
In many classes, the intelligence process is referred to as a cycle, similar to the research process or cycle. In fact, if you put the two side by side, they in many ways mirror each other. In Figure 2.1, we can see that many of the components of the “intelligence cycle” mirror that of the research cycle. Both often begin with planning and designing. In research you need to figure out how to manage and fund your research, and while this is a concern in the intelligence process, it’s not often included in the process. Collection in the intelligence cycle is part of the “search” phase in the research cycle. “Processing and Exploitation” is also part of the search and analyze process; however, in the intelligence cycle, analysis and exploitation are treated separately. Finally, all of these result in some level of sharing of your research or analysis: “dissemination.”
The intelligence process is often considered to be a cycle. In many ways it is. It can be initiated by some requirement, resulting in some level of dissemination, which may in turn result in additional taskings and requirements.
But, rarely does the cycle pan out as simply as often conveyed. The same is true of academic research. Rarely are these “cycles” as simple as progressing from one step to the next without having to reassess, recollect data, reanalyze, etc. Each component is related to the next, and, while there is a general progression, there are times when you as a researcher or analyst need to know when to go back to another component to produce the most rigorous analysis possible. You may collect the information and process it, only to find that you need to collect more information. Or, you may make it all the way to the analysis phase and realize you need to collect more information. In fact, you may make it to the analysis phase and realize you need to go back to the planning stage. Much like academic research, intelligence analysis is rarely cut-and-dried. Figure 2.2 depicts the complicated nature of the intelligence process.
Many scholars have discussed the general conceptual issues with the “Intelligence Cycle.” Some scholars, like Hulnick (2006), dissect many of the individual components, raising the issues that may be overlooked by simplifying intelligence with this conceptual diagram. Other researchers seek to move the intelligence framework forward, including research such as Gill and Phythian (2013) who propose a framework that is less like a cycle and more like a web, trying to capture the complicated nature of intelligence analysis. While it is beyond the scope of this class to assess these various frameworks, it is important to know that while the intelligence cycle is an excellent starting point for understanding intelligence analysis, it is an extremely simplified construct.
Gill, P. & Phythian, M. (2013). From Intelligence Cycle to web of intelligence: complexity and the conceptualization of intelligence. In M. Phythian (Ed.), Understanding the Intelligence cycle (pp. 21-42). Taylor & Francis Group.
Hulnick, A. S. (2006). What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6), 959-979.
Charles Sturt University Library [4] (2021). For researchers.
Clark, R. M. (2011). The Technical Collection of Intelligence. CQ Press.
Gill, P. & Phythian, M. (2013). From Intelligence Cycle to web of intelligence: complexity and the conceptualization of intelligence. In M. Phythian (Ed.), Understanding the Intelligence cycle (pp. 21-42). Taylor & Francis Group.
Hulnick, A. S. (2006). What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6), 959-979.
How Intelligence Works. (n.d.). U.S. Intelligence Careers. Retrieved December 16, 2021, from
A discipline by any other name is still Cultural Geography in nature. Cultural Geography and its concepts have been a core part of intelligence and military operations since the formal beginnings of Geography as an academic discipline. Recognizing the utility of understanding the landscape, countries engaged in military operations as early as the 1870s often used geography and cartography to aid in their endeavors (Forsyth, 2019). The terms used to describe the incorporation of cultural geographic concepts in intelligence have evolved, as have the ethical issues surrounding it. Do the benefits of incorporating these concepts outweigh the ethical issues? This lesson will help you navigate the minefield of this aspect of cultural geography.
The geographic discipline has always had a nexus in military and intelligence operations. The use of maps and cartography to understand the landscape and devise effective military strategies in operations has been employed since at least the 1870s (Forsyth, 2019). Cartography was not the only aspect of the discipline that governments found useful in their endeavors: they also relied upon the discipline’s ability to provide spatial context to political and economic issues, which have their basis in cultural geography (Forsyth, 2019).
After the quantitative revolution of the 1950s, the 1960s saw the geographic discipline take a more humanistic approach, distancing itself from the military nexus and focusing more heavily on social issues (Forsyth, 2019; Rech et al., 2015). This was accompanied by a methodological shift in which human geographers, concerned with positivism’s tendency to dehumanize its subject in an era of increasing civil unrest, turned away from quantitative methods and toward social theory and phenomenology as lenses with which to approach their research. This is not to say that social science was not still incorporated into intelligence; however, it was not as prevalent or overt. Intelligence and military failures, such as those from the Vietnam War (1955-1975), also helped demonstrate the need for better and more comprehensive sociocultural understandings of the places where military and intelligence actions were taking place. While there are multiple aspects that led to the ultimate failure of the Vietnam War, the lack of sociocultural understanding played a significant role. For example, in 1962, US forces began relocating South Vietnamese families from their homes into “strategic hamlets” where they were kept under the control of US forces to prevent the Vietcong from hiding amongst them (British Broadcasting Company, n.d.). This however, removed these people from their ancestral lands, and demonstrated a lack of sociocultural understanding on the part of US forces about the importance of those lands to the rural populations in South Vietnam and perhaps even led to mistrust between the US forces and the local population.
The military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s has also helped to reinvigorate the relationship between human geography and military-intelligence contexts (Rech et al., 2015). In 2006, Lieutenant General David Petraeus specifically referenced the need for human geographical considerations in military and intelligence operations when he provided 14 observations from Iraq. Almost every one of these observations has a cultural geographic nexus; however, observation nine, “Cultural awareness is a force multiplier,” is the most overt (Petraeus, 2006). Petraeus makes the key observation that, without knowledge and understanding of the people, their culture, and their history, any operations will be difficult, if not impossible. These 2006 observations reinvigorated the conversations about integrating Human Geography and sociocultural understanding into military and intelligence operations. Many argue that these observations, spurred by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, inspired the popularization of analyzing “human terrain” (Wainwright, 2016).
Despite its resurgence between 2005 and 2007, the term "human terrain" was first used in 1968 (Medina, 2016; Wainwright, 2016). While human terrain is, by its nature, multi- and interdisciplinary, it draws in large part from key foundational concepts of cultural anthropology and human geography. The Human Terrain System (HTS) was developed after 9/11 when people realized the importance of a sociocultural understanding. HTS became popularized in 2005, and it emphasizes a very micro-level, ethnographic, and anthropological perspective (Medina, 2016; Pawinski, 2018). Beginning in around 2007, anthropologists began to be deployed with the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of Human Terrain Teams (HTT). These deployed and deployable HTTs often encompassed at least five individuals who interfaced with local populations, including a team leader, social scientist, research manager, and two Human Terrain Analysts (Pawinski, 2018). HTTs were slowly rolled out in Iraq in 2012 and Afghanistan in 2013 (Price, 2017). Not long after the installment of HTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, controversy emerged amongst the academic anthropological community about ethical issues surrounding the discipline’s role in HTTs and its synthesis with the military (Medina, 2016; Pawinski, 2018).
While the program drew down, the utility of sociocultural understanding to military and intelligence operations did not wane. After 2010, a shift away from anthropology and towards human geography occurred in many branches of the military and intelligence, including the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (Wainwright, 2016; Medina, 2016). This shift also signified a change in the scale of sociocultural understanding: from a micro-scale to a more strategic macro-scale. Medina (2016) characterizes this shift as also a shift away from the face-to-face interactions integral to anthropologic understanding to a more “systematic” approach, including a greater presence of Geographic Information Systems. To this end, in 2011, the World-Wide Human Geography Data (WWHGD) Working Group was established as a mechanism for discussing and organizing Human Geography-related data to meet the needs that were unveiled by the investigation of natural and technical disasters: the Human Security Taxonomy (Medina, 2016; WWHGD). The WWHGD Working Group established 13 themes described in the Human Security Taxonomy, including: communication, demographics, economy, education, ethnicity, groups (civil, political, and ideological), land, language, medical, religion, significant events, transportation, and climate.
What does the shift in scale from micro-scale anthropologic focus to a more macro-scale, strategic, human/cultural geographic focus portend for sociocultural understanding in military and intelligence studies? Does this more macro-scale focus mean a lack of face-to-face interactions, as Medina (2016) postulates? How will that impact sociocultural understanding? Whatever the military-intelligence complex decides to call it, the importance of sociocultural understanding in intelligence analysis is here to stay. What inception it takes may evolve overtime; however, the inclusion of human and cultural geographic principles will be closely intertwined, as well as the interdisciplinary nature of understanding people and places.
Medina, R.M. (2016). From anthropology to human geography: Human terrain and the evolution of operational sociocultural understanding. Intelligence and National Security, 31(2), 137-153.
Pawinski, M. (2018). Going beyond human terrain system: Exploring ethical dilemmas. Journal of Military Ethics, 17(2-3), 122-139.
Price, B. R. (2017). Human terrain at the crossroads. Joint Force Quarterly, 87(4), 69-75.
Wainwright, J. D. (2016). The U.S. military and human geography: Reflections on our conjuncture. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 106(2), 513-520.
Forsyth, I. (2019). A genealogy of military geographies: Complicities, entanglements, and legacies. Geography Compass, 13(3), e12422.
Medina, R.M. (2016). From anthropology to human geography: Human terrain and the evolution of operational sociocultural understanding. Intelligence and National Security, 31(2), 137-153.
British Broadcasting Company. n.d. The Vietnam War. Reasons for US failure in defeating the Vietcong [5].
Pawinski, M. (2018). Going beyond human terrain system: Exploring ethical dilemmas. Journal of Military Ethics, 17(2-3), 122-139.
Petraeus, D. H. (2006). Learning counterinsurgency: Observations from soldiering in Iraq. Military Review, 45-55.
Price, B. R. (2017). Human terrain at the crossroads. Joint Force Quarterly, 87(4), 69-75.
Rech, M., Bos, D., Jenkings, K. N., Williams, A., and Woodward, R. (2015). Geography, military geography, and critical military studies. Critical Military Studies, 1(1), 47-60.
Most of the time, when we hear about the use of human and cultural geography in intelligence analysis and military operations, it is because it wasn’t factored in and led to an intelligence or military failure. That said, there are times when human and cultural geographic analyses and information have been used to the success of missions and analyses. One such example comes from American and British success in Nawa, Afghanistan.
Understanding human and cultural geography, as well as anthropological understanding, are often imperative to success when interacting and interfacing with other cultures and geographic regions. One major success story of intertwining sociocultural understanding with military operations was the stabilizing operational success of the Marines in Nawa, Afghanistan in 20019 (Medina, 2016; Meyerle et al., 2012). After defeating the Taliban, who controlled the area and forced the community to close their schools and businesses, the Marines who were stationed in Nawa worked to rebuild the infrastructure and build trust with the locals. Their sociocultural understanding and continued efforts to build that understanding is what helped those operations become successful. By not dropping bombs and protecting the civilians and communicating with those living in Nawa and with their leadership, the Marines were able to build trust. Patrols included frequent meetings with locals and leaders, leading to discussions of the concerns of the district. In many ways, the Marines deployed to Nawa used their sociocultural understanding and continued to build on that understanding in order to help this district stabilize and transition power peacefully to the local government. The military used what they understood about culture, space, and place to be successful and stabilize this region.
Before completing the Lesson 2 Discussion assignment, read the vignette about the Marines’ time in Nawa from On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice (Meyerle et al., 2012).
More often than not, it is the failures that are publicized over the successes. As such, there are many examples of failures to use human and cultural geographic understanding causing failures in military and intelligence operations. One such example was presented earlier discussing failures in Vietnam. More recent examples can be brought forward from the many commission reports that have been published. One such example is The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005) report, where the recognition that geographical context is important to understanding intelligence challenges is highlighted. The importance of understanding the world, its cultures, economies, people, and how they interact was a key takeaway from this report. While the words “human geography” or “cultural geography” were not used, it is indeed clear that the discipline that can help shed the most light in these areas.
Meyerle J., Katt, M., and Gavrilis, J. (2012). On the ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in practice. Marine Corps University Press.
Any discipline’s interaction with the military, intelligence, and conflict often undergoes intense scrutiny by its members. This dialogue is important for ensuring the ethical use of the information gained by the fusion of a discipline into the military-intelligence nexus. Due to the “secretive” nature of the military-intelligence nexus, there is often a perception of less-than-virtuous motives; however, that isn’t always the case (Medina, 2016; Pawinski, 2018). Below are some beginning thoughts for and against the inclusion of human geographical, cultural geographical, and anthropological researchers and concepts into the military and intelligence fields. It is by no stretch an all-inclusive list, but a beginning for you to consider as you formulate your arguments for your discussion post.
For Inclusion | Against Inclusion |
---|---|
The inclusion of sociocultural understanding can help reduce kinetic operations and reduce casualties (Price, 2017). |
Historic misuse of the social sciences in conflict zones causing researchers to have ethical concerns that the information may be used to harm individuals (Pawinski, 2018). |
Researcher’s participation can help ensure ethical practices are maintained (Pawinski, 2018). |
Financial support may cause others to question the objectivity of the research (Pawinski, 2018). |
More positive interactions with local populations and leaders (Bartholf, 2011; Price, 2017). |
Classification issues leading to research not developing the discipline in academia (Pawinski, 2018). |
Bartholf, M. C. (2011). The requirement for sociocultural understanding in full spectrum operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 37(4), 4-10.
Medina, R. M. (2016). From anthropology to human geography: Human terrain and the evolution of operational sociocultural understanding. Intelligence and National Security, 31(2), 137-153.
Pawinski, M. (2018). Going beyond human terrain system: Exploring ethical dilemmas. Journal of Military Ethics, 17(2-3), 122-139.
Price, B. R. (2017). Human terrain at the crossroads. Joint Force Quarterly, 87(4), 69-75.
As history has shown us, the intersection of the entire geographic discipline, to include human and cultural geography, have been intertwined with the military and intelligence disciplines. The success or failure of military and intelligence operations, as well as peacekeeping missions, has often rested on how well these concepts have been understood and used. Ethical issues have arisen and been debated between academics and intelligence/military analysts; however, the utility and need for this sociocultural understanding in order to succeed has not been debated.
How can these two intertwined disciplines co-exist and complement each other? Is it possible? Many researchers and practitioners have presented options and suggestions to help the two disciplines work together (Pawinski, 2018; Price, 2017; Medina, 2016).
Pawinski, M. (2018). Going beyond human terrain system: Exploring ethical dilemmas. Journal of Military Ethics, 17(2-3), 122-139.
Price, B. R. (2017). Human terrain at the crossroads. Joint Force Quarterly, 87(4): 69-75.
For this week, you have been assigned to a Canvas team to argue either for or against the inclusion of cultural and human geographic concepts in military and intelligence analysis and operations. We have asked ChatGPT without significant prompt engineering, to craft a persuasive argument that supports your team’s position. Each group should work together to prepare a collaborative critique of ChatGPT's persuasive argument (400 to 500 words) and collaborative Group Position Statement (700 to 1,000 words). Each student is then responsible for reading the opposing Group Position Statements and then preparing an Individual Rebuttal (300 to 500 words).
Please return to the Lesson 2 module in Canvas where you will see two assignments:
Both pages in Canvas provide specific instructions for the assignments.
Please check the Canvas Syllabus or Calendar for specific time frames and due dates.
A central part of earning a master's degree is demonstrating the ability to conduct research and to analyze real-world phenomena. The value of doing research and analysis is not limited to academia; these are skills that have immense practical value in both personal and professional spheres, especially within the fields of intelligence and human security, where analysis is the heart of the work. It takes training and practice to learn and refine research and analysis skills; this is why the successful completion of a well-written and well-documented research project is one of the requirements to pass GEOG 571. This research project is worth 200 points total.
The first step in developing a research project is having a clear idea of what phenomenon you want to address. Typically this means finding a question for which you do not have an easy or ready answer, and which is not immediately answered by existing literature. This is your research question. A good research question will help you determine what kind of background information, theoretical concepts, and data you will need to carry out your research.
The Research Project Guidelines page [6] contains a list of broad research project questions to get you started, and some examples of specific research questions used by previous students. You are encouraged to develop your own specific research question that falls within those guidelines.
To ensure that your research project is relevant to this course, you will need to incorporate at least two of the theoretical concepts that we use during the term. It is important to use them because they will help you maintain a spatial or geographic perspective, and will allow you to actually use what you’re learning in this course.
We do not expect you to have a deep understanding of these concepts up front, and we expect that the concepts you incorporate may shift as you begin your research—but it is important to start thinking about it now. To that end, we ask that you include two or more concepts from the list below that you think may be relevant to your research project. The list includes links to the sections of our course text that introduce each concept.
We ask you to provide three scholarly sources that will get you started on your research. Students sometimes struggle to find sources that fit their project. One thing to remember is that there are different kinds of sources, which serve different functions in research:
There are several ways to find sources. Here are two that we recommend:
Remember to vet your sources. Scholarly sources will be published in peer-reviewed journals, edited volumes, or books from major academic publishers (e.g., any of the university presses, Routledge, Sage, Brill, etc.). Just because a source comes up in the Penn State Library or on Google Scholar does not necessarily mean that it’s a scholarly source. If it’s from a journal, make sure the journal is peer-reviewed. If it’s a book, make sure it’s from an academic publisher. Sources from newspapers, weekly magazines, or policy documents may be relevant and you may use some in your research, but they do not count as scholarly sources.
For more information about the research project, please review the Research Project information pages [23]. A link to the Research Project information pages is also available in the Lessons menu.
Your submission for this week should contain the following:
When you are ready to submit your research project proposal and related information, please return to Canvas and open the Lesson 2 Research Project Proposal dropbox in the Lesson 2: Cultural Geography, Intelligence, and Security module.
This lesson introduced you to the intersection of cultural geography, intelligence, and the military, with regards to both its successes and its failures. It has challenged you to see both sides in the debate for and against cultural geography's inclusion in intelligence and military analyses and operations. The concepts you have considered in this lesson will be applied throughout the course as you consider the variety of applications of cultural geography within the intelligence discipline.
You have reached the end of Lesson 2! Double-check the to-do list on the Lesson 2 Checklist page [25] to make sure you have completed all of the activities listed there before you begin Lesson 3.
Note: Please refer to the Calendar in Canvas for specific time frames and due dates.
If you have any questions now or at any point during this week, please feel free to post them to the GEOG 571 - General Discussion Forum. (That forum can be accessed at any time in Canvas by opening the Lesson 0: Welcome to GEOG 571 module in Canvas.)
Links
[1] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/470
[2] https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icintelligence.html
[3] https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
[4] https://library.csu.edu.au/for-researchers
[5] https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zv7bkqt/revision/3
[6] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/432
[7] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/438
[8] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/461
[9] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/462
[10] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/464
[11] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/149
[12] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/473
[13] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/266
[14] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/171
[15] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/168
[16] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/164
[17] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/221
[18] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/176
[19] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/213
[20] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/364
[21] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/457
[22] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/499
[23] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/430
[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRCHdhdS_aU&ab_channel=UniversityofSouthAustralia
[25] https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog571/node/65